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BOOK REVIEWS
FREE-_ SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT. By Alexander
Meiklejohn. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. Pp. 107. $2.00.
SPECULATION o1 the meaning of freedom of speech is as old as tyranny;
it is as new as today's editorial on the clash of East and West. A recent ad-
dition to the crowded shelf is an analysis of the First Amendment which
frequently departs from "what the judges say it is." This is no idle contempla-
tion of the constitutional navel; the reader can expect to find his wits and,
more painfully, his favorite truisms, put to serious challenge. Those who
respond to an intellectual irritant will find it provocative and rewarding reading.
Professor Meiklejohn's major thesis is that the concept of free speech
is meaningless unless considered in its relation to popular government. He
shows a lofty disdain for the confusion of free speech with boisterous self-
expression, for in the democratic state freedom of speech has an urgency
which is of weightier dimensions than individual comfort. The free airing of
all evidence before the electorate is a basic postulate of self-government. So
vital is it for all contributions, all opinions to be heard when the people are at
once "their own subjects and their own masters" that the protection of the
First Amendment is unqualified. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech." No exception is indicated; therefore, none can be
allowed.
This emphatic protection applies only to what Meiklejohn terms the public
right of free speech-"advocacy of action by the government"--or that self-
expression which the citizen engages in as a lawmaker.
In a sense, the citizenry as a great body of lawmakers is entitled to the
same legislative immunity enjoyed by representatives. No matter how un-
popular his plea, a Congressman is not compelled to limit himself to "mere
academic and harmless discussion." Nor is he silenced as "unwise, unfair, un-
American." The only check upon his ideas is the ballot which retires him
from office, and Meiklejohn argues that free and unlimited debate is-as essen-
tial in public places as it is in the legislature. All those who govern must be
free to hear, and only they may decide that a doctrine is foolish or eangerous-
not with a decree of silence but through a negative vote. "To be afraid of
ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government."
The author is in obvious conflict with the clear and present danger doc-
trine of Mr. Justice Holmes, and a considerable portion of the book is de-
voted to a refutation of that famous analysis, not only as a misinterpretation,
but as a direct violation of the First Amendment. According to Holmes, speech
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can be inhibited if it is the direct cause of results which Congress may prevent.
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Meiklejohn's attack is three-fold. First, Congress may enforce a law
against evil; it may punish transgressors: it may not punish those who protest
against the law or its enforcement. He who cries "fire" in a crowded theatre
may be guilty of manslaughter. He may be deprived of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, but not freedom of speech, This is the voice of Socrates who defied the
citizens of Athens when they bade him be silent, but would not flee from the
cup of Hemlock because the citizen court had decreed it.
The second barrage against Holmes can be briefly stated: "Some preven-
tions are more evil than the evils from which they would save us." Any lim-
itation upon speech is a threat to the whole framework of self-government,
and a judicial principle which would permit it is therefore more dangerous to
the state than the words it would silence. Legislative immunity recognizes
no emergency which would restrain the lawmaker; Holmes would have shud-
dered at the suggestion that judicial dissenters represented a "clear and pres-
ent" threat to the effectiveness of majority decisions; minorities in the popular
assembly must have the same protection.
Finally, the criticism of Holmes accentuates the revisions in the original
doctrine wrought by the Brandeis decisions. Customarily, these two justices
are treated as common defenders of freedom of speech. Indeed, the dissents
referred to were written with justice Holmes concurring, but Meiklejobn
finds in them a laudable correction of the constitutional and intellectual error
in the Holmes reasoning of 1919. Brandeis, in 1927, held that "no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for free discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and the fallacies, to avert the evil through the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." His stress lies not
upon danger, but upon the emergency which in itself interferes with the full
and free discussion of ideas. The only quietus sanctioned by the author is one
which would command that "public discussion must be, not by one party
alone, but by all parties alike, stopped until the order necessary for fruitful
discussion has been restored."
Emphasis thus far has been placed upon the right of public free speech.
It has not included slander, sedition, treason or words which incite men to
individual criminal action. Nor does it include private free speech. The ex-
pression of selfish aims by the merchant, unionist and lobbyist Meiklejohn
regards as one of the liberties of the Fifth Amendment protected only by the
"due process" clause. •
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The distinction between "freedom of speech" and "liberty of speech,"
between public and private free speech, flows easily from the pen; but, in the
opinion of this reviewer, the weakest point in the Meiklejohn brief is the
failure to consider the "twilight zone" of definition. Variance, quickly pointed
up by examples, is not so easily distinguished in actual litigation.
The advertiser, merchant and trade unionist offer arguments in which
the quality of self-interest is easily discerned by their opposition. Frequently,
it can be diagnosed to the satisfaction of most "reasonable men." However,
so astute an observer as Meiklejohn should not have failed to consider the
sincerity with which individuals can identify their personal comfort with the
general welfare. The Holmes dictum that "the best test of truth is the power
of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market place" was
too brusquely dismissed. It is easy to suggest that there is an immoral cast to
such wholesale selfishness---more virtuous to demand that the citizen speak,
think and vote for the entire commonwealth-but at times there is no surer
road to public truth than the free exchange of egotistical proposals. If one
hundred and forty million cry out when the shoe pinches, the body politic can
at least be relieved of its corns.
Yet Meiklejohn's mournful cry that such a position destroys the basis of
our education for "devotion to the general welfare" should not go unheeded.
Recognition of sectional, economic and group motivation in public action need
not become advocacy of ruthless self-interest. The legislative immunity which
this discussion has bestowed upon public speech commands deeper respect
than the "natural rights" doctrine of the 18th century. It involves far more
than personal license; it is at once a tribute to each man and a command that
he be honest, intelligent and worthy of the public ear.
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THE SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF LAW. By John Tracy. New York: Prentice
Hall, Incorporated, 1948. Pp. 469. $5.75.
TuIis work presents a kaleidoscopic survey of the primary problem that
confounds the young attorney, namely: how to be successful in his chosen
field. Mr. Tracey runs the gamut of innumerable problems which beset the
beginner, such as: what type of stationery to buy, where to keep the statutes
in one's office, how to close a sale of real estate, where to locate one's office,
how to obtain and keep clients, how to fix fees, and so forth.
Under one cover can be found the solution to literally hundreds of ques-
tions which confront the youthful practitioner. Its value, however, is not to
the beginner alone, for its multitude of suggestions also challenges the present
